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Intra-Corporate Communications:
Sufficient Publication For Defamation
or Mere Corporate Babbling?
by DAVEN G. LOWHURST*
I
Introduction
This note analyzes the following hypothetical problem in the
law of defamation. The president of General Motors Corpora-
tion (G.M.) suspects that a particular vice president, I.M. De-
Famed, has been engaging in illegal stockmarket transactions
in G.M. stock. Based on this suspicion and with little concrete
evidence, the president decides to discharge Ms. DeFamed. She
has, however, been very popular among G.M. employees for
supporting employee concerns during union contract negotia-
tions. The president contacts one of his personnel relations em-
ployees in order to defuse this unpopular management decision
before it reaches G.M. employees. The president directs this
employee to send out a circular to all G.M. employees inform-
ing them that Ms. DeFamed has been discharged for engaging
in illegal stockmarket transactions. This employee, acting in
the ordinary course of his duties, complies by sending out the
circular to 100,000 G.M. employees.
Assuming the circular is libelous, the doctrine of respondeat
superior would make the president personally responsible and
would impose liability on G.M. as well. However, the courts in
several states would deny Ms. DeFamed the opportunity to pur-
sue her grievance against the corporation by finding that the
libelous circular was not published to a third person as is re-
quired for a successful defamation action. The popular vice
president's reputation has been harmed in the eyes of 100,000
persons without recompense.
The tort of defamation protects an individual's interest in
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sound reputation and good name. When an individual's reputa-
tion has been harmed by the statements of another, he or she is
entitled to seek legal redress against both the person making
the defamatory statement and, if the statement was made in
the ordinary course of business, against the person's employer
as well.
A successful defamation suit requires that the allegedly false
and defamatory statement be communicated to a person other
than the individual who claims to have been wronged. This is
the "publication" requirement. Courts have taken divergent
paths in determining whether a communication between co-
employees, made in the ordinary course of business, constitutes
a publication. Some courts have adopted what will be referred
to as the "no-publication rule"-that such a communication is
not a sufficient publication where the defendant is the corpo-
rate or individual employer of the co-employees. Other courts
have criticized this rule in an effort to support the traditional
theory underlying defamation actions-that a sufficient publi-
cation occurs as soon as any third person has understood the
statement as defamatory, regardless of the defendant's status.
This note examines this split of authority. It compares the
cases and arguments advancing the no-publication rule with
the cases and arguments advancing the traditional view. The
note first discusses dictations to stenographers' and then ad-
dresses all intra-corporate communications.2 The note con-
cludes that since the no-publication rule precludes the defamed
person from receiving compensation for a defamatory state-
ment, the traditional theory underlying defamation is better
suited to deal with defamatory communications in the corpo-
rate context.
II
The Tort of Defamation
"Defamation is ... that which tends to injure 'reputation' in
the popular sense; to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or
confidence in which the plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse,
derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against him."' 3
1. For the purpose of this note, stenographers are defined as persons employed
primarily to take and transcribe dictations.
2. For purposes of this note, intra-corporate communications encompass any
communication between directors, officers, and employees of the same corporation.
3. W.P. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTs § 111, at 773 (5th ed. 1984)
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However, a statement defamatory of another does not subject
its publisher to liability for defamation unless the statement is
false.4 Since the gravamen of the tort is damage to the plain-
tiff's name and reputation in the eyes of the community, the
false and defamatory matter must be communicated to some-
one other than the person defamed.5 The legal term of art for a
defamatory communication to a third person is "publication. '"6
Thus, if the defamatory words are communicated by the
speaker to no one but the plaintiff, no publication occurs, and
consequently no right of action for defamation arises regardless
of how derogatory, insulting, or scandalous the words may be.7
In many instances, a defendant is not held liable for defama-
tion even though he admittedly published a false and defama-
tory communication to a third person. This results from the
existence of a privilege' that immunizes the defendant's acts
from liability in order to protect society's interest in the free
flow of information and ideas:9
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER & KEETON]. See R. HEUSTON, SALMOND ON TORTS 142
(16th ed. 1973); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). Defamation is com-
posed of libel and slander, two forms of action which distinguish the means by which
the defamatory matter is published to a third person. Generally, libel refers to writ-
ten or printed words but has been extended to include any publication embodied in a
relatively permanent, physical form. On the other hand, slander generally refers to
oral communications. See PROSSER & KEETON § 112, at 785-88; M. NEWELL, SLANDER
AND LIBEL 1 (4th ed. 1924); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 comment a (1977).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A (1977).
5. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 111, at 771; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 577 comment b (1977). See J. TOWNSHEND, SLANDER AND LIBEL 144-45 (3d ed.
1877); Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess Hosp., 74 N.D. 525, 528,23 N.W.2d 247,251 (1946).
6. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 113, at 797; see M. NEWELL, supr note 3,
at 218. Publication of defamatory matter is its intentional or negligent communica-
tion to one other than the person defamed. Ranous v. Hughes, 30 Wis. 2d 452, 461, 141
N.W.2d 251, 255 (1966); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 (1977).
7. J. TOwNsHEND, supra note 5, at 146. The plaintiff may, however, have an ac-
tion for the intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress, neither of which
require publication. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, §§ 12, 54.
8. "Immunity" is a more accurate term than "privilege" since the defendant is in
effect immunized from liability for a defamatory communication rather than privi-
leged to defame. But since courts more frequently use the term privilege, this term
will be used throughout this note.
9. The significance of privileges was diminished to some extent by New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), where the United States Supreme Court
recognized a constitutional privilege based on the rights of freedom of the press and
speech guaranteed by the first amendment. The privilege operates by altering the
nature of the defendant's fault required to sustain a defamation recovery. Generally,
to be liable for defamation, the false and defamatory communication must have been
made with knowledge of the communication's falsity, in reckless disregard of its truth
or falsity, or negligently. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B (1977). However,
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The defense of privilege arises in those situations in which
the public interest in permitting persons to speak or write
freely without being restrained by the possibility of a suit for
defamation outweighs the policies behind the law of defama.
tion which imposes broad liability for the publication of false
matters tending to injure the reputation of others .... In
these situations the courts recognize the defense of privilege
... which may be absolute or qualified.10
Absolute immunity, that is, immunity notwithstanding the
defendant's purpose and motive, has been limited to those situ-
ations where social policy favors complete and uninhibited
freedom of expression."' Absolute privilege has been extended
only to defamatory statements made: (1) during judicial pro-
ceedings; (2) during legislative proceedings; (3) by executive of-
ficers of government in the discharge of their governmental
duties; (4) with the consent of the plaintiff; (5) between hus-
band and wife; or (6) when required by law.U
Most privileged defamatory publications enjoy only a quali-
fied or conditional privilege, arising where society's interest in
encouraging the free flow of information is significant but not
substantial enough to afford a defense to one who defames ma-
liciously or for any other inappropriate reason.'3 Instead, soci-
ety's interest dictates that the publisher shall be protected only
to the extent that he communicates in good faith. These quali-
fied privileges have been extended: (1) where the defendant
publishes defamatory matter for the protection or advance-
New York Times held that where the plaintiff is a public official or public figure alleg-
ing a false and defamatory communication concerning his or her conduct or fitness in
that capacity, the defendant's communication must have been made with either
knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard of its truth or falsity; mere negligence is
insufficient. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 113, at 804-08; RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 580A (1977).
10. Sokolay v. Edlin, 65 N.J. Super. 112, 124, 167 A.2d 211, 217 (1961).
11. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 114, at 815-16.
12. I at 816-24. Although it is possible that the communication made by the de-
fendant in the context of this note would be sufficient to establish one of the afore-
mentioned situations giving rise to an absolute privilege, such a situation need not be
considered here since the defendant would not be liable in any jurisdiction if an abso-
lute privilege applies. The result is the same as if there had been no publication of the
defamatory matter. For further discussion of the applicability of absolute privilege to
defamation actions, see id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 585-592A (1977).
13. Ranous v. Hughes, 30 Wis. 2d 452, 466-67, 141 N.W.2d 251, 258 (1966). The
concept of qualified or conditional privilege has been widely accepted as affording
protection in those situations where a defamatory communication is not absolutely
privileged but is nevertheless protected.
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ment of his or her own lawful interests;14 (2) where a defend-
ant publishes defamatory matter for the protection or
advancement of a lawful interest of another;15 (3) where the
publisher and the recipient of the defamatory communication
have a common interest in the communication, and the commu-
nication is reasonably calculated to protect or further that in-
terest;16 (4) where the communication is made to someone who
may reasonably be expected to take official action to protect a
public interest, or where a defendant publishes the defamatory
matter while engaged in public discussion on a subject of legiti-
mate public interest;17 or (5) where reports of judicial, legisla-
tive, executive, or administrative proceedings are not afforded
an absolute privilege.'
The distinguishing feature of a qualified privilege is that it is
indeed qualified: if one abuses it, one loses it. 19 The privilege
may be lost where a publisher does not reasonably believe
either that the publication is necessary to protect the interest
involved,2 or that the interest to be protected justifies the pub-
lication.2 ' The privilege also may be lost by the use of language
which is either beyond what is reasonably necessary to protect
the interest2 or is more intemperate or abusive than warranted
by the occasion that prompted the publication.23 Finally, the
privilege may be abused and thereby forfeited if the publisher
of the false and defamatory matter is motivated to make the
14. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 115, at 824-26; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 594 (1977).
15. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 115, at 826-28; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 595 (1977).
16. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 115, at 828-30; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 596 (1977).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 598 (1977); PROSSER & KEETON, supra
note 3, § 115, at 830-32.
18. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 115, at 836-38. This privilege is based on
the public interest in the reporting of judicial, legislative, and administrative proceed-
ings and the recognition that an individual reporting such proceedings to the public
"is merely a substitute for the public eye." Id at 836.
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 599 (1977); PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 3, § 115, at 832-35. See generally, Hallen, Excessive Publication in Defama-
tion, 16 MINN. L. REV. 160 (1932).
20. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 115, at 825-26.
21. Id. at 826-28.
22. Id at 826.
23. Sheftall v. Central of Ga. Ry., 123 Ga. 589, 592, 51 S.E. 646, 648 (1905); Zim v.
Bradley, 268 A.D. 1063, 52 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1945).
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defamatory statement solely by spite or ill will,2 4 or if the com-
munication was made with knowledge of falsity or with reck-
less disregard for the truth.'
III
Respondeat Superior
Courts consistently have held that an employee can be held
accountable for his or her own torts.2 Under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, a corporation, as a separate legal entity,
may also be liable for the tortious conduct of its employees.
Assuming an employee is personally liable for a defamatory
statement, this doctrine imposes liability on the employee's cor-
porate employer in four situations: (1) where the employee, in
making the statement, was carrying out express orders or act-
ing pursuant to express authority of the corporation;' (2)
where the employee, in making the statement, was acting pur-
suant to implied authority of the corporation;" (3) where the
statement was subsequently ratified by the employer;29 or (4)
where the employee, in making the statement, was acting
within the scope of his employment.30
24. Sokolay v. Edlin, 65 N.J. Super. 112, 127, 167 A.2d 211, 219 (1961); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 603 comment a (1977).
25. Pirre v. Printing Devs., Inc., 468 F. Supp. 1028, 1044 (S.D.N.Y.), cffd, 614 F.2d
1290 (2d Cir. 1979); Tumbarella v. Kroger Co., 85 Mich. App. 482, 494, 271 N.W.2d 284,
289 (1978); Gem Trading Co. v. Cudahy Corp., 22 Wash. App. 278,281-82,588 P.2d 1222,
1224 (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 600 (1977).
26. See, e.g., Bell v. Clinton Oil Mill, 129 S.C. 242,256,124 S.E. 7,12 (1924); Miles v.
Louis Wasmer, Inc., 172 Wash. 466, 471-72, 20 P.2d 847, 849 (1933).
27. Draper v. Heilman Commercial Trust & Say. Bank, 203 Cal. 26, 38-39, 263 P.
240, 246 (1928); Gillis v. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 223 N.C. 470, 474, 27 S.E.2d 283, 286
(1943).
28. Gillis v. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 223 N.C. 470, 474, 27 S.E.2d 283, 286 (1943).
29. Rosenberg v. J.C. Penney Co., 30 Cal. App. 2d 609,623,86 P.2d 696,704 (1939);
Lion Oil Co. v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 252 Ill. App. 92, 99 (1929).
30. Randall Dairy Co. v. Pevely Dairy Co., 291111. App. 380, 390-91, 9 N.E.2d 657,
661 (1937); Hammond v. Eckerd's of Asheville, 220 N.C. 596, 601, 18 S.E.2d 151, 155
(1942); Mann v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tenn., 132 S.C. 193, 197, 129 S.E. 79, 80
(1925). "An act is within the scope of... employment where necessary to accomplish
the purpose of... employment and intended for that purpose, although in excess of
the powers actually conferred upon the [employee]." West v. F.W. Woolworth Co.,
215 N.C. 211, 214, 1 S.E.2d 546, 548 (1939).
As long as the employee is acting within the scope of his duties, the corporation can
be held liable for the employee's tort even if the corporation had no knowledge of the
employee's tort, did not authorize the particular act, and even gave the employee di-
rect instructions to refrain from engaging in such an act. Gillis v. Great AtI. & Pac.
Tea Co., 223 N.C. 470, 474, 27 S.E.2d 283, 286 (1943). Otherwise, "an employer could
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The underlying rationale for the doctrine is that a duty rests
upon every man to conduct his affairs so as not to bring injury
upon another, and this duty exists regardless of whether "he" is
an individual or a corporation, or whether "he" carried out his
affairs himself or with the aid of an employee or agent.31 Re-
spondeat superior has been applied uniformly to defamation ac-
tions where there is a corporate employer/employee
relationship, even where the employee communicated with ac-
tual malice.32
However, regardless of the identity of the entity ultimately
liable, a successful defamation plaintiff must first establish
publication to a third person.33 This publication requirement
has led to confusing and inconsistent decisions addressing cor-
porate and individual liability for the defamatory communica-
tions of employees.
IV
Decisions Favoring the No-Publication Rule
A. The Stenographer Cases
The no-publication rule has its roots in early cases where cor-
porations were absolved of liability for defamatory dictations
from one employee to another. The inaugural case advancing
the no-publication rule is Owen v. Ogilvie Publishing Co.3 In
that case, a plaintiff sued a corporation after its general man-
ager, in carrying out the corporation's business, dictated a letter
to one of the corporation's stenographers expressing a suspicion
that the plaintiff had taken money from the cash drawer. Ac-
cording to the court, the issue was whether there was a publica-
tion of the letter by the corporation. The court held that the
stenographer was not
to be regarded as a third person in the sense that either the
dictation or the subsequent reading can be regarded as a publi-
cation by the corporation. It was a part of the manager's duty
avoid all liability for the torts of his employees by the simple expedient of instructing
them not to commit them." Id at 476, 27 S.E.2d at 287.
31. See Poutre v. Saunders, 19 Wash. 2d 561, 565, 143 P.2d 554, 556 (1943).
32. See, e.g., Houston Printing Co. v. Jones, 282 S.W. 854 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
Malice of the employee is imputed to the employer because "the act having been done
for [the employer's] benefit by his agent acting within the scope of his employment in
his business, it is just that he should be held responsible for it in damages." Lothrop v.
Adams, 133 Mass. 471, 480-81 (1882).
33. See aupra text accompanying notes 5-7.
34. 32 A.D. 465, 53 N.Y.S. 1033 (1898).
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to write letters for the corporation, and it was the duty of the
stenographer to take such letter in shorthand, copy it out and
read it for the purpose of correction. The manager could not
write and publish a libel alone, and we think he could not
charge the corporation with the consequences of this act,
where the corporation, in the ordinary conduct of its business,
required the action of the manager and the stenographer in the
usual course of conducting its correspondence .... [T]he act
of both servants was necessary to make the thing complete.
The writing and the copying were but parts of one act, ie., the
production of the letter.a
Thus, the Owen court held that a defamatory dictation trans-
mitted between corporate employees acting within the scope of
their employment is not a publication sufficient to establish
corporate liability for defamation. The court embraced what
will be referred to in this note as the "one corporate act theory"
to support its holding: since the allegedly defamatory commu-
nication was between employees of the same corporation en-
gaged in the performance of a single corporate act, there was no
third person to whom the defamatory communication had been
published. Thus, where a corporation is merely "speaking to
itself," the publication requirement will not be satisfied unless
the defamatory matter is communicated to a third person in-
dependent of the corporation.
The Owen court explicitly left undecided the issue of
whether a publication occurs where the relationship between
the person dictating and the stenographer, rather than being
one of co-employees of a common master, is that of master and
servant, that is, where the person dictating is the individual em-
ployer of the stenographer.3
Several courts have followed Owen although they have relied
upon different rationales to reach the same conclusion. Basing
their holdings on the one corporate act theory advanced in
35. Id at 466-67, 53 N.Y.S. at 1034.
36. 1& at 466, 53 N.Y.S. at 1034. The court explained:
It may be that the dictation to the stenographer and her reading of the letter
would constitute a publication of the same by the person dictating it, if the
relation existing between the manager and the copyist was that of master and
servant, and the letter be held not to be privileged. Such, however, was not
the relation of these persons. They were both employed by a common




Owen, courts in Alabama,3 Georgia,38 New York,3 North Car-
olina,40 and Virginia4' have held that the dictation from one
corporate employee to another, if made during the perform-
ance of their duties of employment, does not constitute
publication.
A second rationale supporting the no-publication rule was
advanced in Cartwright-Caps Co. v. Fischel & Kaufman,2 in
which the court held that the dictation of an allegedly libelous
letter from the president of a corporation to one of the corpora-
tion's stenographers did not constitute publication. The court
offered only a pragmatic rationale, which will be referred to in
this note as the "business necessity theory," for its decision:
It is inconceivable how the business of the country, under the
present conditions, can be carried on, if a business man or cor-
poration must be subject to litigation for every letter contain-
ing some statement too strong, where it is only sent to the
person to whom directed, and only heard by a stenographer to
whom the letter is dictated.4'
Finally, at least one court has advanced two additional ratio-
nales for the no-publication rule. In Freeman v. Dayton Scale
Co.," a former employee sued a corporation for an allegedly
libelous letter dictated by a corporate employee to a corporate
stenographer. Even though the defendant was a corporation,
the court, in dictum, chose to extend the no-publication rule to
individual defendants. The court first determined that the dic-
tation of a libelous letter to a stenographer does not constitute
sufficient publication because
the stenographer, if a coemployee in a corporation, has no dis-
37. Burney v. Southern Ry., 276 Ala. 637, 641-42, 165 So. 2d 726, 730-31 (1964).
38. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Jones, 18 Ga. App. 414, 414, 89 S.E. 429, 429 (1916) (ste-
nographer and agent to whom an allegedly libelous letter was mailed, both employed
by the same corporation, are not third persons).
39. Wells v. Belstrat Hotel Corp., 212 A.D. 366, 389, 208 N.Y.S. 625, 628 (1925);
Loewinthan v. Beth David Hosp., 9 N.Y.S.2d 387, 371-72 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Mirs v. Met-
ropolitan Life Ins. Co., 200 F.2d 800,802 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 345 U.S. 940 (1952).
40. Satterfleld v. McLellan Stores Co., 215 N.C. 582, 585-86, 2 S.E.2d 709, 711
(1939).
41. Chalkley v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 150 Va. 301, 331-35, 143 S.E. 631, 639-40
(1928); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Nance, 165 Va. 363, 380-81, 182 S.E. 264, 270-71
(193).
42. 113 Miss. 359, 74 So. 278 (1917).
43. Id. at 363, 74 So. at 279-80. The court also denied the plaintiff's claim against
the corporation on the grounds that the letter was a privileged communication. ICE at
363, 74 So. at 279.
44. 159 Tenm. 413, 19 S.W.2d 255 (1929).
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tinct third party entity, and, if an employee of an individual, is
a confidential instrumentality only of the libelant, not recog-
nized, when engaged in the performance of this mainly
mechanical duty, as possessing an independent third party
personality.4
Thus, the court held that where the defendant in a defama-
tion action is a corporation, and the dictation involves two of its
employees, there is no publication under the "one corporate act
theory."4' Where the defendant is an individual and the dicta-
tion is from an individual employer to an employee, the court
held that there is similarly no publication under what will be
referred to in this note as the "mechanical process theory,"
which provides that because stenography is a mechanical pro-
cess involving little cognitive thought, stenographers are to be
considered dictation devices rather than third persons.47
The court advanced an additional rationale for its finding of
no publication: "[A]s a practical proposition, it should be said,
to the credit of those engaged in [stenography], that experience
demonstrates that their loyalty and fidelity is universally such
that communications confided to them are not disclosed."
4
Under what will be referred to in this note as the "confidential-
ity theory," the court thus proposed that where material is dic-
tated to a stenographer, the expected response of the
stenographer is non-disclosure, resulting in no harm to the de-
famed person. Applying the one corporate act and confidential-
ity theories, the court in Freeman concluded that no
publication occurred from the dictation.49 Freeman has been
followed by several other courtss °
In summary, several cases have held that dictations to ste-
nographers in the ordinary course of business are not publica-
tions sufficient to support an action for defamation. Many of
45. Id at 421, 19 S.W.2d at 258.
46. Idc See aupra text accompanying notes 34-35.
47. 159 Tenn. at 421, 19 S.W.2d at 258. See W. ODGERS, LIBEL AND SLANDER 161
(5th ed. 1911).
48. 159 Tenn. at 421, 19 S.W.2d at 258.
49. I&, 19 S.W.2d at 258.
50. Rodgers v. Wise, 193 S.C. 5, 9, 7 S.E.2d 517, 519 (1940) (attorney charged with
libel and slander after making an allegedly defamatory dictation to his secretary:
"The reasoning of (Freeman] is [even] more convincing when the dictation is by a
lawyer to his stenographer about a client's behavior."). See also Insurance Research
Serv. Inc. v. Associates Fin. Corp., 134 F. Supp. 54 (M.D. Tenn. 1955); Watson v. Wan-
namaker, 216 S.C. 295, 57 S.E.2d 477 (1950).
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these cases have limited this rule to corporate defendants,'1 but
other cases have extended this reasoning to individual
defendants.a
In support of the no-publication rule, the courts have ad-
vanced four rationales. First, under the one corporate act the-
ory, dictation from one corporate employee to another
constitutes one act of the corporation and consequently does
not constitute publication to a third person.53 Second, under
the business necessity theory, business would be severely im-
paired if a businessperson was subjected to a defamation action
for every defamatory statement communicated solely to a ste-
nographer." Third, under the mechanical process theory, ste-
nography is a mechanical process in which the stenographer is
unaware of the defamatory matter being dictated, and thus no
harm can occur from the dictation.55 Finally, under the confi-
dentiality theory, experience has shown that stenographers
maintain the confidentiality of any matter dictated to them,
thereby precluding any harm from the dictation.' These four
rationales will be considered in examining the following cases
in which the no-publication rule has been extended to non-
stenographic situations.
B. The Intra-Corporate Communication Cases
Many cases have applied the reasoning set forth in the ste-
nographer cases and have held that a defamatory communica-
tion between a corporation's employees is not a publication
supporting an action for defamation.57 These "intra-corporate
communication" cases, like the preceding stenographer cases,
have inconsistently applied the no-publication rule without
considering the defendant's status as an individual or a
corporation.
The most frequently cited case extending the no-publication
rule to intra-corporate communications is Piins v. Holland-
North American Mortgage Co.58 In Prins, an employee sued his
corporate employer for libel after one employee sent an alleg-
51. See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
54. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
55. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 61-78 and accompanying text.
58. 107 Wash 206, 181 P. 680 (1919).
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edly libelous letter from the corporate headquarters to another
corporate office. The letter was read by two corporate employ-
ees acting within the scope of their employment. The court
held.
Agents and employ6s [sic] of this character are not third per-
sons in their relations to the corporation... [but] are a part
and parcel of the corporation itself, so much so, indeed, that
their acts within the limits of their employment are the acts of
the corporation. For a corporation, therefore, acting through
one of its agents or representatives, to send a libelous commu-
nication to another of its agents or representatives cannot be a
publication of the libel on the part of the corporation. It is but
communicating with itself .... It is not the publication of a
libel for a person to write and mail a libelous letter to the per-
son libeled if he gives it no further publication; and, for a much
stronger reason, it is not a publication of a libel for one person
to write a libelous letter to himself which he exhibits to no
other person. It must follow that a corporation, although it can
act only through officers and agents, is not guilty of publishing
a libel when it writes a libelous letter at one of its branch of-
fices and mails it to another.59
Thus, the court adopted the one corporate act theory estab-
lished in Oweno--that a dictation from one employee to an-
other constitutes a single corporate act and thereby precludes
the existence of a publication. But the court extended the the-
ory to encompass not just dictations, but any communication
between employees of the same corporation: "[W]hen [an of-
ficer and stenographer] each acts in his line of duty to the com-
mon employer, plainly the acts of the [officer] are to be
accorded the same legal effect as the acts of the [stenogra-
pher]."'1 The court in Prins distinguished the case from Gaim-
brill v. Schooley,6 2 which held that, in the context of an
individual defendant, dictation to a stenographer was not suffi-
cient publication." Thus, the Prins court held that a communi-
cation between employees of the same corporation, if made
within the scope of their employment, is not a publication sup-
porting an action for defamation against a corporate defendant.
59. I at 208-09, 181 P. at 680-81.
60. Owen, 32 A.D. at 466-67,53 N.Y.S. at 1034. See supra notes 34-36 and accompa-
nying text.
61. Prvs, 107 Wash. at 211, 181 P. at 681.
62. 93 Md. 48, 48 A. 730 (1901). See infra notes 81-93 and accompanying text.
63. Prins, 107 Wash. at 210-11, 181 P. at 681.
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With one exception," all the intra-corporate communication
cases adopting the no-publication rule rely directly or indi-
rectly on Prins.l Cases that follow the Prins holding have
been decided in Alabama,66 Florida,' Georgia,s Louisiana,s
64. Knight v. Georgia S.W. & G. Ry., 18 Ga. App. 539, 90 S.E. 81 (1916) (forged
shipping order maintained in corporation's files held not to constitute publication).
Knight was decided three years before Prins and therefore did not rely on Prins as
precedent. The underlying rationale for the court's holding is unclear, but the court
seemed to emphasize the fact that the shipping order was maintained to further the
corporation's business and that the action was against a corporate defendant. It is
clear that the court in Knight held that even If a corporation is aware that it has
printed false accusations, if these accusations reach no one but its employees acting
within the scope of their employment in transacting the corporation's business, no
publication has occurred with which to sustain a defamation suit against the corpora-
tion. Idi at 543, 90 S.E. at 83.
65. The Prins court held that intra-corporate communications made by employ-
ees acting within the scope of their employment are not publications sufficient to sus-
tain an action for defamation against the corporate defendant. See supra notes 58-63
and accompanying text.
66. In McDaniel v. Crescent Motors, Inc., 249 Ala. 330, 31 So. 2d 343 (1947), a cor-
poration's traffic manager allegedly slandered one of its bus drivers in front of two
other managers. Two prior Alabama Supreme Court decisions had found a sufficient
publication on similar facts. See Berry v. City of N.Y. Ins. Co., 210 Ala. 369, 98 So. 290
(1923); Ferdon v. Dickens, 161 Ala. 181, 49 So. 888 (1909). Nonetheless, the McDaniel
court chose to limit those decisions and follow Prins by distinguishing McDaniel on
the facts: in the two prior decisions, the plaintiff had not been an employee of the
defendant at the time of the defamation, whereas the plaintiff in McDaniel was an
employee of the defendant corporation. The court stated that these two prior cases
do not apply when the managers of a corporation discuss among themselves
complaints in respect to an employee of that corporation .... The ques-
tion we are dealing with is one of publication and not that of a qualifiedly
privileged communication, which loses its effect as privileged by malice. We
do not reach the matter of privilege, malice or any other question until there
is a publication.
249 Ala. 332-33, 31 So. 2d at 345. It should be noted that the distinction in McDaniel
between a plaintiff who is an employee of the defendant corporation (no publication)
and a plaintiff who is not an employee (publication) has no logical or theoretical justi-
fication. Whether or not there has been a sufficient publication is determined solely
by whether or not the defamatory matter was communicated to a third person; the
status of the plaintiff should be completely irrelevant.
In United States Steel Corp. v. Darby, 516 F.2d 961 (5th Cir. 1975) (applying Ala-
bama law), a corporation's employees prepared memoranda impugning the plaintiff's
financial stability which were circulated to other employees. Like the court in Mc-
Daniel, the court in Darby recognized the prior Alabama Supreme Court decisions
finding a sufficient publication in dictations to stenographers. Id. at 963. But having
recognized the McDaniel limitation that there is no publication when the plaintiff is
an employee of the defendant corporation, the court chose to follow Burney v. South-
ern Ry., 276 Ala. 637, 165 So. 2d 726 (1964) (a stenographer case):
While Darby was not a [U.S. Steel] employee, we do not read the Alabama
Supreme Court's decision in Burney as limited to that situation. In our opin-
ion Burney establishes that one of the essential elements of the defamation
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Missouri,70 South Carolina,7 ' Wisconsin;72 cases that follow the
cause of action-publication-was missing here. The district court properly
granted summary judgment for [U.S. Steel].
Darby, 516 F.2d at 964. Having found the plaintiff not to be an employee of the de-
fendant corporation, the McDaniel limitation became inapplicable, and the court
should have been constrained to follow the precedents of Ferdon and Berry, both ap-
plicable where the plaintiff is not an employee of the defendant corporation. Instead,
the Darbiy court chose to rely on Burney in which the plaintiff was an employee of the
defendant corporation. But Burney relied on McDaniel for the very reason that the
plaintiff was an employee of the defendant corporation; thus, both cases are inapplica-
ble to, and should have been disregarded in Darby. Regardless of the insufficient
grounds for the distinction set out in McDaniel, the court in Darby should have abided
by McDaniel in applying Alabama law.
67. Biggs v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R, 66 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1933). The court, apply-
ing Florida law to a case involving letters sent between three managers of a corpora-
tion, recognized that although there was some authority allowing communications
between officers of a corporation to be privileged, "to rest the decision on this ground
would involve an inquiry as to the good faith of the defendant. As there was no publi-
cation of the libel, whether the communications were privileged is immaterial." ICE at
87.
68. In LuAllen v. Home Mission Ed. of S. Baptist Convention, 125 Ga. App. 456,
459, 188 S.E.2d 138, 140 (1972), a supervisor's written report criticizing an employee
was passed on to a corporate committee in charge of reviewing employee perform-
ance. Having found that the report had not been published, the court expressly de-
clined to decide whether the communication was privileged. kI at 459-60, 188 S.E.2d
at 140; Jackson v. Douglas County Elec. Membership Corp., 150 Ga. App. 523, 524, 258
S.E.2d 152, 153 (1979) (a letter sent from one employee of a corporation to another);
George v. Georgia Power Co., 43 Ga. App. 596, 596-97, 159 S.E. 756, 757 (1931) (letter
containing false statements regarding the salesman's efficiency and attentiveness was
passed between agents of a corporation). The court expressly recognized the conflict
of authority surrounding the issue of publication versus privilege and decided to ad-
here to its prior ruling in Central of Ga. Ry. v. Jones, 18 Ga. App. 414, 89 S.E. 429
(1916), but limited its applicability to corporate defendants:
IThe rule which would prevent the sending and receipt of the letter from
being considered as a publication as to the corporation would not apply so as
to protect the agents from liability as individuals, where it is shown that they
conspired together, the one to write and the other to receive the letter, for
the purpose of injuring a third person by false and malicious statements
therein contained.
George, 43 Ga. App. at 597, 159 S.E. at 757. The court then sustained the dismissal of
the action against the corporation but reversed the dismissal against the individual
defendants. Id at 598, 159 SE. at 757. In effect, the court held that with respect to the
same communication, a publication had occurred by the individual employees but not
by the corporation. The court provided no rationale.
69. Cangelosi v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Mkts., 390 So. 2d 196, 198 (La.
1980) (store manager's statement in the presence of four supervisors); Commercial
Union Ins. Co. v. Melikyan, 424 So. 2d. 1114, 1115 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (communication
between two employees of a corporation). Interestingly, the Commercial Union court
acknowledged Prosser's criticism that such an approach confuses publication with
privilege, W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 113 (4th ed. 1971), but chose to follow
Cangelosi. 424 So. 2d at 1115 n.1.
70. Hellesen v. Knaus Truck Lines, Inc., 370 S.W.2d 341, 344 (Mo. 1963) (letter
written by an employee and placed in the corporation's files).
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Prins holding and extend it to individual defendants have been
decided in Missouri,7 3 Nevada,7 4 and Oklahoma;75 one case in
Georgia reached the same conclusion as Prins even though the
only defendant was an individual.76 Courts have also cited
Prins as support for extending the no-publication rule outside
the corporate context to a college77 and a church."
71. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Lesesne, 198 F.2d 154,157-58 (4th Cir.), cert denied,
344 U.S. 896 (1952) (applying South Carolina law) (message communicated between
employees of a telegraph company).
. 72. Flynn v. Reinke, 199 Wis. 124, 129-31, 225 N.W. 742, 744 (1929) (telegram sent
over telegraph company's wires); Halsell v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 683 F.2d 285, 289
(8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1205 (1983) (applying Wisconsin law) (letter sent
from corporation engineer to a manager). It should be noted that the court in Halsell
incorrectly followed the Wisconsin Supreme Court's holding in Lehner v. Associated
Press, 215 Wis. 254, 259-60, 254 N.W. 664, 666-67 (1934), which held such a communica-
tion to be conditionally privileged. In fact, the defendants in Lehner never raised the
issue of publication.
73. Ellis v. Jewish Hosp., 581 S.W.2d 850, 851 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (libel action
against a hospital and its executive director when the director made false evaluations
of a pharmacist's work and then incorporated them into the pharmacist's personnel
file where they were read by hospital supervisors).
74. Jones v. Golden Spike Corp., 97 Nev. 24, 26-27, 623 P.2d 970, 971 (1981) (slan-
der action against a corporation and its president for a statement made by the presi-
dent). Since the action was brought against both a corporate and individual
defendant, the court implicitly extended the holding in Prins to individual
defendants.
75. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Davidson, 194 Okla. 115, 119, 148 P.2d 468, 471
(1944) (action for slander against a corporation and one of its employees for the em-
ployee's statement to other employees). The court stated that it did "not see any ne-
cessity of applying the qualified privilege rule to the conversation... for the reason
that... the statements of [one corporate agent to another] could not be considered as
a matter of law a publication." Id. at 119, 148 P.2d at 471. Since the Magnolia court
held that there was no publication and since both an individual as well as a corporate
defendant were charged with slander, it follows that the court implicitly extended the
Prins holding to individual defendants.
76. King v. Schaeffer, 115 Ga. App. 344, 346-47, 154 S.E.2d 819, 821-22, qffd, 223
Ga. 468, 155 S.E.2d 815 (1967) (action against a corporation's manager for his allegedly
slanderous statements). Since the only defendant was an individual manager and
since the court found no publication, the court reached the same conclusion as Prins
in the case of an individual rather than a corporate defendant; the holding in Prins
was not at issue because there was no corporate defendant. It is interesting that the
court approvingly cited, inter alia, George v. Georgia Power Co., 43 Ga. App. 596, 159
S.E. 756 (1931), which reached a conclusion directly contradictory to King. George
held that there was a publication by the individual defendant but not by the corporate
defendant. Id. at 596-97, 159 S.E. at 757.
77. In Walter v. Davidson, 214 Ga. 187, 104 S.E.2d 113 (1958), a student sued a
faculty member of a college for slander after the faculty member accused the student
of committing theft in the student dormitory. The Georgia Supreme Court, referring
to Central qf Ga. Ry., 18 Ga. App. 414, 89 S.E. 429 (1916), stated that
[t]he Court of Appeals has held that an accusation by an officer of a corpora-
tion dictated to his stenographer and addressed to another officer of that cor-
poration against a third person is not slander because it is not published ....
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V
Decisions Opposing the No-Publication Rule
Although many cases have applied the no-publication rule to
defamatory dictations and other corporate communications, a
growing body of case law has rejected the no-publication rule in
favor of the traditional view which recognizes that a communi-
cation to anyone other than the person defamed satisfies the
publication requirement in a defamation action.
A. The Stenographer Cases
Several cases have held that a dictation containing defama-
tory material may constitute a sufficient publication to support
an action for defamation. In Pullman v. Walter Hill & Co.,79 an
Will the law allow privileges in this matter to officers of a corporation en-
gaged in business for profit, and deny it to officers of a college engaged in an
unselfish effort to build good citizens by educating and training boys and
girls? Such is not the law. The college faculty members are entitled to the
same privilege, and the law will protect them in exercising it.
Walter, 214 Ga. at 190, 104 S.E.2d at 115. The court held that as long as faculty mem-
bers are acting within the scope of their duties to their collegiate employer, state-
ments concerning thefts by students "are not publications... which are essential to
constitute actionable slander." Id. at 191, 104 S.E.2d at 116. The rationale provided by
the court is that such statements "are the legal equivalent of speaking only to one's
self." Id., 104 S.E.2d at 116. Thus, the court by analogy applied the one corporate act
theory supporting the no-publication rule in the context of a college. Because no pub-
lication results from a communication between two corporate employees, no publica-
tion can result from a communication between two faculty members of the same
college when made in the scope of their employment with the college.
Since the defendant in Walter was an individual faculty member rather than the
college, the court was extending the holding in Prins to individual defendants. An
analytical problem arises because the precedential link between Walter and Prins is
George, 43 Ga. App. 596,159 S.E. 756. In George, the Georgia Court of Appeals adopted
the holding but declined to extend Prins to individual defendants. Id at 597, 159 S.E.
at 757. If George had been followed by analogy in Walter, the result would have been
a finding of no publication only with respect to the college; as to the defendant faculty
member, there would have been a sufficient publication. Thus, the holdings of George
and Walter are inconsistent regarding to whom the no-publication rule applies.
78. In Monahan v. Sims, 163 Ga. App. 354, 294 S.E.2d 548 (1982), the plaintiff, an
applicant for priesthood, sued a bishop and a church for defamation when an accusa-
tion that the plaintiff was a homosexual and practiced black magic was passed from a
reverend to the bishop and then to members of a commission on ministry. The court
found that all persons who had communicated the accusation and all persons to whom
the accusation had been communicated were acting under official church authority in
an inquiry to determine the plaintiff's suitability for elevation to priesthood. The
court held that there had been no publication of the allegedly defamatory accusation
with which to hold either the bishop or the church liable, adding that "the malice
with which communications may be made is immaterial where there is no legal publi-
cation of the defamatory information." Id. at 358, 294 S.E.2d at 551.
79. (1891] 1 Q.B. 524.
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English case, a director of a company dictated an allegedly de-
famatory letter to a company stenographer. The letter was
transcribed by the stenographer and then copied by a clerk and
mailed to the plaintiff. The defendant argued the business ne-
cessity theory: if merchants cannot employ clerks to transcribe
letters for them in the ordinary course of business, they cannot
properly conduct business. Lord Judge Lopes responded that
"the answer to this [argument] is very simple. I have never yet
heard that it is in the usual course of a merchants' business to
write letters containing defamatory statements."'s Thus, the
court held that a sufficient publication had occurred with re-
spect to both the stenographer and clerk.
Following the rule laid down in Pullman, the court in Gam-
brill v. Schooley81 held that the dictation of a libelous letter to a
stenographer constituted a sufficient publication to support a
defamation action against the person dictating the letter. The
defendant advanced four arguments to support his contention
that the dictation did not constitute a publication.
First, the defendant argued that stenographers function in a
purely mechanical manner, and although the information dic-
tated is received by the stenographer, the reception is "instan-
taneous only, and merely sufficient for their reduction to
written characters... [and] there [is] no comprehension and
no lodgment of their meaning in the brain of the [stenographer]
... so that there was no such perception as is requisite to con-
stitute publication. 8 2 The court rejected the mechanical pro-
cess theory" advanced by the defendant, pointing out that a
dictation produces as complete a perception of the dictator's
thoughts in the mind of the stenographer as would a slower
communication to a non-stenographer, especially since a pro-
fessional stenographer must pay sufficiently close attention to
assure accuracy in the dictation. 4
Second, the defendant argued that in view of the widespread
use of stenographers and their necessary role in modern busi-
ness, an exception should be made to the general rule that any
communication to a third person constitutes publication. The
80. Id. at 530.
81. 93 Md. 48, 48 A. 730 (1901).
82. Id. at 49, 48 A. at 731.
83. Supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
84. Gambril 93 Md. at 49, 48 A. at 731.
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court rejected the business necessity theorys advanced by the
defendant, stating that:
Apart from any precedent or authority, we can perceive no
good reason why such an exception should be made to the rule.
Neither the prevalence of any business customs or methods,
nor the pressure of business which compels resort to steno-
graphic assistance, can make that legal which is illegal, nor
make that innocent which would otherwise be actionable.8.
Third, the defendant argued that no harm results from a dic-
tation to a stenographer because stenographers generally do
not disclose dictated matter. The court rejected the confidenti-
ality theorys7 argued by the defendant:
Nor can the fact that the stenographer is under contractual or
moral obligation to regard all his employer's communications
as confidential alter the reason of the matter. This defense
was made in Williamson v. Frer, L.R. 9 C.P. 393, where it was
held that the unnecessary transmission by a post-office tele-
gram of libelous matter which would have been privileged if
sent in a sealed letter avoids the privilege; Lord Coleridge, C.
J., saying, "Although the clerks are prohibited, under severe
penalties, from disclosing the contents of telegrams passing
through their hands, still there is a disclosure-to them."ss
Finally, the defendant advanced the one corporate act the-
ory 9 presented in Owen:9° when the dictation occurs between
two persons employed by a common master and engaged in the
performance of duties required by their employment, the ste-
nographer should not be regarded as a third person since the
production of the letter constituted but one corporate act.
Although the court distinguished Owen on the ground that
Owen dealt with a corporate rather than individual defendant,
the court voiced displeasure with Owen's holding-
[C]orporations are liable for all acts, whether willful or mali-
cious, of their agents or servants, done in the course of their
employment, and that actions for such injuries, including libel,
could be sustained against corporations in any case where
under similar circumstances such actions could be sustained
against individuals for the acts of their servants.91
85. Supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
86. Gambrill 93 Md. at 49, 48 A. at 731.
87. Supra notes 44, 47-50 and accompanying text.
88. Gambrill, 93 Md. at 49, 48 A. at 731.
89. Supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
90. 32 A.D. at 466-67, 53 N.Y.S. at 1034-35.
91. GambriI4 93 Md. at 50, 48 A. at 732.
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The Gambrill court thus refuted all four rationales support-
ing the no-publication rule and held that a sufficient publica-
tion of the letter occurred. The court concluded that no
privilege existed since the stenographer "had no conceivable in-
terest in hearing or seeing the letters."92 Many courts have fol-
lowed Gambrill without addressing directly the four theories
supporting the no-publication rule.93 A few courts, however,
have articulated specific objections.
1. Mechanical process theory
In Globe Furniture Co. v. Wright,4 the plaintiff sued a corpo-
ration for libel when one of its employees dictated and circu-
lated a letter among other employees insinuating that the
plaintiff had tampered with sales receipts. In rejecting the
mechanical process theory, the court stated:
Some courts hold that communications such as the one we are
considering are not actionable, because the stenographer or
other employS, [sic] to whom the communication was made
before it was mailed to the person for whom it was intended, is
not a third person, within the technical meaning of such term,
but is merely an impersonal facility used in making and trans-
mitting the communication .... But we prefer to put our de-
cision upon the ground that the occasion was conditionally
privileged, that the letter was within the privilege, that there
was no malice, and therefore that the letter is not actionable.95
By reaching the issue of privilege, the court implicitly recog-
nized that a publication had occurred.
In Ostrowe v. Lee,6 a libel suit was launched against the de-
fendant after he dictated a letter to his secretary accusing the
plaintiff of larceny. The court held that publication occurs
through a dictation-at least where the stenographer reads and
transcribes the notes from the dictation:
Publication there still is as a result of the dictation, at least
where the notes have been examined or transcribed .... Very
often a stenographer does not grasp the meaning of dictated
words till the dictation is over and the symbols have been read
92. 1&
93. See, e.g., Sun Life Assurance Co. v. Bailey, 101 Va. 443, 445-46, 44 S.E. 692, 693
(1903); Mick v. American Dental Ass'n, 49 N.J. Super. 262, 277, 129 A.2d 570, 577-78
(1958); Ferdon v. Dickens, 161 Ala. 181, 187, 49 So. 888, 891 (1909); Horovitz v.
Wetdenmiller, 53 N.Y.S.2d 379, 390 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
94. 265 F. 873 (D.C. Cir. 1920).
95. Id. at 876.
96. 256 N.Y. 36,175 N.E. 505 (1931).
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.... The author who directs his copyist to read, has displayed
the writing to the reader as truly and effectively as if he had
copied it himself .... There is publication of a libel if a ste-
nographer reads the notes that have been taken by another.
Neither the evil nor the result is different when the notes that
he reads have been taken by himself.'
Although Ostrowe involved a private stenographer, nothing
suggests that the holding would be inapplicable to a corporate
stenographer.9
Perhaps the most stinging criticism of the mechanical process
theory was unleashed by the court in Rickbeil v. Grofton Dea-
coness Hospital," where an allegedly libelous letter was dic-
tated by a hospital manager to his stenographer. The court
stated:
To hold that a stenographer is not an individual but a mere cog
in the machine because of modern development necessitated
by the changes in business methods is a derogation of human
personality, and not in harmony with the modern conception
of the dignity of labor.1"
Thus, the court acknowledged that stenographers are not mere
dictation devices incapable of any comprehension. Although
the plaintiff must always prove that the recipient of the defam-
atory communication understood the communication as defam-
atory of the plaintiff, if the plaintiff can satisfy this burden, the
stenographer should not be deemed a mere mechanical device.
To deny the plaintiff any redress where a stenographer is
shown to have understood a communication as defamatory of
the plaintiff on the grounds that the stenographer is incapable
97. Id. at 38-40, 175 N.E. at 505-06.
98. In Bradley v. Connors, 169 Misc. 442, 7 N.Y.S.2d 294 (Sup. Ct. 1938), the de-
fendant argued that the Ostrowe court's rejection of the no-publication rule should be
limited to cases where an individual dictates to his or her own stenographer and that
the no-publication rule should be retained where a corporate employee dictates to a
corporate stenographer. The Bradley court rejected this argument on the grounds
that if the stenographer has read and understood the defamatory matter, "whether he
or she is a corporate stenographer or the stenographer of a private individual, in fair-
ness and reason, should not be the deciding factor." Id, at 444, 7 N.Y.S.2d at 296. The
Bradley court thus affirmed and extended the holding in Ostrowe, implicitly rejecting
the holding in Owen.
99. 74 N.D. 525, 23 N.W.2d 247 (1946).
100. Id. at 540, 23 N.W.2d at 255. The court held that "the dictating of this letter by
the manager to the stenographer and her transcription of her notes into the written
instrument constitutes publication ... whether the relationship be that of master
and servant or of coemployees of a corporation." Id. at 542, 23 N.W.2d at 256.
[Vol. 7
INTRA-CORPORATE COMMUNICATION
of understanding the communication as defamatory is not only
a non sequitur but is also a miscarriage of justice.
2. Business necessity theory
The Rickbeil'° ' court expressly rejected the business neces-
sity theory, stating that:
A man's personal right to be free from defamation of character
... is surely not dependent upon the supposed cold necessities
of business, so that to sacrifice rights of individuals to supposed
business necessity becomes controlling in the determining of
human relations. The personal rights of the individual to be
free from defamation of character are paramount to any exi-
gencies of business and the stenographer who types and the
office-boy who copies are individuals with personalities even if
mere employees, whether the relationship of master and ser-
vant exists or whether all parties concerned are employees of
an employer common to each.10 2
3. Conf4dentiality theory
The confidentiality theory was rejected in Berry v. City of
New York Insurance Co.,10 3 where an employee of a corporation
dictated an allegedly libelous letter to a corporate stenogra-
pher. The court held that:
[O]ne who receives a dictation, takes notes, reduces same to
typewriting, may be influenced in his or her estimate of the
character of a person by libelous matter therein. On principle
a man is as much entitled to protection in the esteem of a ste-
nographer as of any one else.1°4
In Nelson v. Whitten,"° the court similarly stated that there is
no basis for the belief that a communication made to one occu-
pying a stenographer position would be less injurious to plain-
tiff than if it were made to any other of defendant's
employees. 1' 6
101. 74 N.D. 525, 23 N.W.2d 247.
102. Id. at 529, 23 N.W.2d at 255.
103. 210 Ala. 369, 98 So. 290 (1923). This case was later limited by McDaniel v.
Crescent Motors, Inc., 249 Ala. 330, 31 So. 2d 343 (1947), which adopted the no-publica-
tion rule where a plaintiff is an employee of a defendant corporation; cf. Berry where
the plaintiff was not an employee of the defendant insurance company.
104. 210 ALa at 371, 98 So. at 292.
105. 272 F. 135 (E.D.N.Y. 1921).
106. Id. at 136.
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4. One corporate act theory
In Berry,1 7 the court found that the one corporate act theory
ignores the essential nature of the libel .... [T]he agent who
dictates the letter causes it to be written, and, so read, is for the
moment the alter ego of the principal. The injury does not
consist in the loss of esteem by an absent and may be corporate
employer. The evil effect is in the loss of esteem by the stenog-
rapher in person, and not in any relation to the chief agent nor
the common employer.1 "
In Lux-Brill Productions v. Remco Industries,1 9 the defend-
ants argued that "the dictation of the letter to the stenographer
is not a publication thereof inasmuch as both the president and
the stenographer are employees of the same corporate defend-
ant."1 0 The court questioned the soundness of its prior hold-
ings in Owen v. Ogilvie Publishing Co."' and Wells v. Belstrat
Hotel Corp."2 that no publication occurs as against a corpora-
tion under the one corporate act theory where a libelous letter
is dictated by an employee of the corporation to a corporate ste-
nographer."' Instead, the court embraced its holding in Os-
trowe" 4 --that there is a sufficient publication when an
individual dictates a letter to his or her stenographer:
Certainly if an individual businessman, in the seclusion of his
private office, publishes, for the purpose of a libel suit,
whatever he dictates to his own stenographer, then no logical
reason can be urged why a corporation should not be liable to
the same degree when one of its officers, through whom alone
it can only act, within the scope of his authority, dictates a
libelous statement to his fellow employee who reads and tran-
scribes the notes of such dictation. Any rule that would treat
the stenographer of a corporation differently from the stenog-
rapher of a private businessman, with reference to the publica-
tion of a libelous statement, would not be sound or just. A
continuation of the rule of law enunciated in the cases of
[Owen] and [Wells] would create a special immunity for corpo-
rations and their officers and employees. A sanctuary would
107. 210 Ala. 369, 98 So. 290.
108. Id. at 371, 98 So. at 292.
109. Lux-Brill, 48 Misc. 2d 697, 265 N.Y.S.2d 440 (1965).
110. Id. at 698, 265 N.Y.S.2d at 441.
111. 32 A.D. 465, 53 N.Y.S. 1033 (1898). See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying
text.
112. 212 A.D. 366, 208 N.Y.S. 625 (1925).
113. Lux-BrilI, 48 Misc. 2d at 698-99, 265 N.Y.S.2d at 441-42.
114. 256 N.Y. 36, 175 N.E. 505.
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be created behind which a corporation and its officers and em-
ployees could libel others with impunity. This court cannot be-
lieve that the law intended to subject the individual
businessman to actions in libel while insulating corporations
from similar suits predicated solely upon the fictional device
that publication is accomplished when an individual dictates to
his own stenographer and no publication results from the dic-
tation of the same libel by a corporate officer to a corporate
stenographer. 115
The court also relied on Kennedy v. James Butler, Inc.," 6
which held that a publication occurred in a defamation action
against a corporate defendant where corporate employees dis-
tributed a libelous circular to the managers of its retail
stores. 17 Analogizing intra-corporate communications to intra-
corporate dictations, the court reasoned:
If a corporate defendant can be said to have published a libel
by circulating it among its own employees, who are the manag-
ers of its stores,. .. then surely a dictation of that same libel
by a corporate officer to one of its stenographers who reads and
transcribes her notes of such dictation, must perforce be a pub-
lication. A corporate stenographer is no less a corporate em-
ployee than its store managers.""
Since the theory behind publication suggests that a dictation
to a stenographer is indeed a sufficient publication, it is impor-
tant to examine what has motivated several courts to apply the
no-publication rule in the context of dictations. One reason
may be their belief that dictations are not privileged comm-
munications since the stenographer generally has no interest in
the dictated matter and is merely the means by which another's
words reach the ultimate recipient of the communication. If
dictations fall outside the realm of privileged occasions, then
the issue of publication becomes crucial. Assuming that a court
is correct in classifying an allegedly defamatory dictation as un-
privileged, if the dictated matter is understood by the stenogra-
pher as defamatory, then a finding of publication will result in
a judgment for the plaintiff, and a finding of no publication will
result in a judgment for the defendant.
115. 48 Misc. 2d at 699, 265 N.Y.S.2d at 442. Accord Arvey Corp. v. Peterson, 178 F.
Supp. 132, 136 (E.D. Penn. 1959); Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess Hosp., 74 N.D. 525,
541-42, 23 N.W.2d 247, 256 (1946).
116. 245 N.Y. 204, 156 N.E. 666 (1927).
117. Id. at 207, 156 N.E. at 667.
118. Lux-Brtil 48 Misc. 2d at 699, 265 N.Y.S.2d at 442.
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At least one court has expressed concern as to
how the business of the country... can be carried on, if a
business man or corporation must be subject to litigation for
every letter containing a statement too strong, where it is only
sent to the person to whom directed, and only heard by a ste-
nographer to whom the letter is dictated." 9
Wishing to protect dictations and realizing that dictations
may not be privileged communications, the courts may have
created their own artificial privilege by finding no publication.
Unfortunately, this artificial privilege is an absolute rather
than qualified or conditional privilege because where there is
no publication, malice on the part of the alleged defamer is ir-
relevant; the defamer is off the hook regardless of the circum-
stances and his motivations.
Dictations in the ordinary course of an individual's or a cor-
poration's business are not situations to which absolute immu-
nity traditionally has been extended. 12° Thus, application of
the no-publication rule affords defamers protection beyond
that traditionally available to them. Although the law should
not unduly hamper ordinary business transactions, there is lit-
tle social interest in protecting malicious dictations. A privilege
which immunizes a publisher when a dictation is made in good
faith (i.e., a qualified privilege) is far more appropriate than ap-
plication of the no-publication rule which immunizes a pub-
lisher from liability for all communications (i.e., an absolute
privilege). The problem that must be addressed is how to ex-
tend a qualified privilege to a situation where the recipient of
the dictation has no interest in the truth or falsity of the dic-
tated matter.' 2 '
119. Cartwright-Caps Co. v. Fischel & Kaufman, 113 Miss. 359, 74 So. 278 (1917).
The court used this argument to bolster its holding that there had been no publica-
tion. However, this argument is far more persuasive for invoking a qualified privilege
than for ruling that no publication has occurred. See supra notes 13-25 and accompa-
nying text.
120. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
121. One solution to this problem was proposed in England in Edmondson v. Birch
& Co., [1907] 1 K.B. 371, 23 T.L.R. 234, a case which held that where defamatory com-
munications are dictated to a stenographer and copied by another clerk on a privi-
leged occasion, the publication to the stenographer and clerk are likewise privileged.
Collins, Master of the Rolls, stated.
[W]here there is a duty ... as between two persons, which forms the ground
of a privileged occasion, the person exercising the privilege [ie., the defamer]
is entitled to take all reasonable means of so doing, and those reasonable
means may include the introduction of third persons (i.e., stenographers],
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In Ostrowe,22 the court addressed the privilege issue in the
context of a dictation. The court recognized and quoted Eng-
lish cases "to the effect that publication to a stenographer, un-
less impelled by actual malice, is protected by a privilege
whenever privilege attaches to the principal communication to
which it is an incident.' 1 23 Several courts have taken the view
that dictations should be qualifiedly privileged when made in
good faith and in the usual course of business.'24 This approach
represents a fair compromise between an individual's right to
be free from harm to his or her reputation and society's interest
in promoting productive business transactions. For this reason,
the no-publication rule, which in effect affords an absolute
privilege, should be abandoned.
B. The Intra-Corporate Communication Cases
Several courts have extended the no-publication rule set
forth in the stenographer cases to any case involving a commu-
nication between corporate employees.125 Since the stenogra-
pher cases were based upon one or more of the four theories
supporting the no-publication rule, a determination of the ap-
plicability of the no-publication rule to intra-corporate commu-
where that is reasonable and in the ordinary course of business; and if so, it
will not destroy the privilege.
I& at 380. Lord Justice Fletcher Moulton concurred, adding-
If a business communication is privileged, as being made on a privileged occa-
sion, the privilege covers all incidents of the transmission and treatment of
that communication which are in accordance with the reasonable and usual
course of business.
Id at 382.
Thus, the courts in England very early decided that the appropriate analysis admits
publication but affords a privilege when the circumstances make it reasonably neces-
sary to make the communication.
122. 256 N.Y. 36,175 N.E. 505.
123. Id at 40, 175 N.E. at 506.
124. Bohlinger v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 100 Ark. 477,484, 140 S.W. 257,259 (1911);
Berry v. City of N.Y. Ins. Co., 210 Ala. 369, 372, 98 So. 290, 292 (1923); Arvey Corp. v.
Peterson, 178 F. Supp. 132, 136 (E.D. Pa. 1959). Contra Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess
Hosp., 74 N.D. 525, 541-42, 23 N.W.2d 247, 256 (1946) (stenographer is not a person who
has an interest in the dictation, so a qualified privilege is not available); Gambrill v.
Schooley, 93 Md. 48, 63, 48 A. 730, 732 (1901) (stenographer "had no conceivable inter-
est in hearing or seeing the letters, and there could be, therefore, no [qualified] privi-
lege between her and the (person dictating the letter]"); Nelson v. Whitten, 272 F.
135, 136 (E.D.N.Y. 1921); Ferdon v. Dickens, 161 Ala. 181, 198, 49 So. 888, 894 (1909);
Sun Life Assurance Co. v. Bailey, 101 Va. 443, 445, 44 S.F. 692, 694 (1903) (dictum).
125. See supra notes 58-78 and accompanying text.
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nications must begin with an appraisal of these theories in the
context of intra-corporate communications.
1. Mechanical process theory
The mechanical process theory' is based on the premise that
stenography is a mechanical process, precluding the stenogra-
pher from comprehending the defamatory matter. Aside from
the argument against the validity of this premise,1 7 the prem-
ise is inapplicable in situations not involving a stenographer. A
stenographer who copies and types a letter to be read by some
other person may arguably be carrying out his or her duties in a
mechanical manner. This argument, however, does not apply
to other employees who, in the course of their employment,
may hear a statement or read a letter from another employee.
While the stenographer is not concerned with the substantive
content of the dictation, an employee to whom a statement or
letter is directed is concerned with the substantive content of
the communication and will undoubtedly pay sufficient atten-
tion to comprehend the communication. The recipient must
understand the meaning of a given communication, and to en-
gage one's mental faculties to this end is not a mechanical pro-
cess. Thus, the mechanical process theory cannot support the
no-publication rule in cases where the recipient of the commu-
nication is not carrying out stenographic services.
2. Business necessity theory
The business necessity theory' s is based on the premise that
since stenographers have become such an ubiquitous and inte-
gral component of business transactions, the flow of business
would be severely hampered if a businessperson or corporation
were subjected to a defamation action every time a defamatory
communication was made to an employee or co-employee in the
ordinary course of business. This argument is admittedly com-
pelling and is in all likelihood valid., However, the real issue
with respect to the business necessity theory involves a deter-
mination of the type of protection which should be invoked to
encourage the smooth flow of commerce. It is submitted that a
qualified privilege, conditioned on the publisher's good faith, is
the proper protection. A qualified privilege would enable em-
126. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 8284 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
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ployees to communicate with each other without fear of defam-
ing another--as long as the communication was made in good
faith and in the ordinary course of business. Only when em-
ployees abused the privilege by communicating with actual
malice, would they be liable for their defamatory statements.
3. Confidentiality theory
The confidentiality theory'-" is based on the premise that ex-
perience indicates that stenographers maintain the confidenti-
ality of any matter dictated to them. The strongest argument
against this theory is that even if the stenographer discloses the
communication to no other person, the stenographer is still a
third person in whose eyes the plaintiff's reputation has been
injured.130 This argument applies with equal force to the intra-
corporate communication cases. Whether the recipient of the
defamatory communication is a stenographer or another em-
ployee, if the recipient understands the communication as de-
famatory, the plaintiff's reputation has been harmed to some
degree, and an action for defamation should not be denied. If
employee A communicates defamatory matter to employee B,
the relevant issues are whether employee B understood the
communication as defamatory and whether employee B dis-
closed the communication to anyone else. If employee A, the
defendant, can establish that employee B did in fact maintain
the confidentiality of the communication, then the issue of
damages will focus solely upon harm to the plaintiff's reputa-
tion based upon the publication to employee B.
4. One corporate act theory
The one corporate act theory13 is based on the premise that,
in an action against a corporation for a defamatory communica-
tion between two of its employees in the ordinary course of
business, the communication constitutes a single corporate act
such that neither employee is considered a third person. Since
the defamatory matter is deemed never to have left the con-
fines of the corporation, there is no publication to a third per-
son; rather, the corporation is regarded as having spoken only
to itself. Since the theory only applies where the defendant is a
corporation, it follows that the one corporate act theory is inap-
129. See supra notes 44, 48-49 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
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plicable in intra-corporate communication cases where the de-
fendant is an individual employer or employee.
Thus, none of the four theories can support the no-publica-
tion rule where the sole defendant is an individual. 3 2 The rule
is equally inapplicable in cases where the corporation and its
employee/defamer are joined as co-defendants.1ss An em-
ployee is not immunized from liablity merely because the one
corporate act theory is adopted to exonerate the corporation.
But even where the sole defendant is a corporation, application
of the no-publication rule is unwarranted.
VI
In Favor of the Traditional Theory
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior,'3 ' a corporation is
held accountable for the torts of its employees acting in the or-
dinary course of business. Since corporations have far greater
assets with which to pay adverse judgments, it is not surprising
that the corporation is joined as a defendant. In fact, the corpo-
ration is usually the sole defendant in defamation actions aris-
ing out of communications made in the ordinary course of the
corporation's business. The no-publication rule is inconsistent
with the doctrine of respondeat superior because the rule yields
an opposite conclusion where a defamatory communication is
transmitted between corporate employees. Under the no-publi-
cation rule, if employee A was acting within the scope of his
employment at the time he made the defamatory communica-
tion to employee B, then the corporation would not be liable
under the one corporate act theory since employee B is not re-
garded as a third person. Under the doctrine of respondeat su-
perior, however, if employee A was acting within the scope of
employment at the time of the defamatory communication,
then the corporation would be liable. Thus, the one corporate
act theory precludes the court's analysis from reaching the doc-
trine of respondeat superior. It is unlikely that the courts ap-
132. King v. Schaeffer, 115 Ga. App. 344, 347, 154 S.E.2d 819, 821, qff'd, 223 Ga. 468,
155 S.E.2d 815 (1967) (employee suing manager); Walter v. Davidson, 214 Ga. 187, 190,
104 S.E.2d 113, 116 (1958) (student suing teacher).
133. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Davidson, 194 Okla. 115, 118-19, 148 P.2d 468, 471
(1944); LuAllen v. Home Mission Bd., 125 Ga. App. 456, 459-60, 188 S.E.2d 138, 140
(1972); Ellis v. Jewish Hosp., 581 S.W.2d 850, 851 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Monahan v.
Sims, 163 Ga. App. 354, 358, 294 S.E.2d 548, 551 (1982) (action against bishop and
church); Jones v. Golden Spike Corp., 97 Nev. 24, 26-27, 623 P.2d 970, 971 (1981).
134. See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
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plying the one corporate act theory desired to eliminate the
doctrine of respondeat superior only where the alleged tort is
defamation and only in the context of intra-corporate commu-
nications, but that is the result of the no-publication rule's
application.
In rejecting the no-publication rule, it has been stated:
The fact that a corporation is an artificial entity, and therefore
can act only through its agents, does not give it any added im-
munity for its torts. Corporate agents are just as much individ-
ual human beings as are the agents of natural persons. The
same rules should apply to both."s
Another court said that it could perceive
no good reason why immunity from liability for defamation
communicated by one agent to another should be accorded to
an enterprise conducted in the corporate form and denied to an
enterprise conducted by an individual or a partnership. The
argument that a communication between agents of the same
corporation is not a communication to a third person is not im-
pressive in dealing with such a subject as defamation and
would apply with almost equal force as between two agents of
the same individual or partnership .... The defense of privi-
lege is widely available in appropriate instances and, we think,
furnishes as great protection as ought to be allowed.ls
135. Mims v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 200 F.2d 800, 803 (5th Cir.) (dissenting
opinion), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 940(1952). Accord Pirre v. Printing Devs., Inc., 468 F.
Supp. 1028, 1041 (S.D.N.Y.), cffd, 614 F.2d 1290 (2d Cir. 1979); Kelly v. General Tel.
Co., 136 Cal. App. 3d 278, 284, 186 Cal. Rptr. 184, 186 (1982); Bander v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 313 Mass. 337, 348-49, 47 N.E.2d 595, 602 (1943); Brewer v. American
Nat'l Ins. Co., 636 F.2d 150, 153-54 (6th Cir. 1980) (expressly rejecting the no-publica-
tion holdings in McDaniel, 249 Ala. 330,31 So. 2d 343, and Prins, 107 Wash. 206, 181 P.
680); Kennedy, 245 N.Y. 204, 207, 156 N.E. 666, 667; Arsenault v. Allegheny Airlines,
Inc., 485 F. Supp. 1373, 1378 (D. Mass.), off'd, 636 F.2d 1199 (1st Cir. 1980); Luttrell v.
United Tel. Sys., 9 Kan. App. 2d 620, 622, 683 P.2d 1292,1294 (1984); Elmore v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 189 N.C. 658, 666, 127 S.E. 710, 716 (1925). This list is by no means
exhaustive.
136. Bander v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 313 Mass. 337, 34849, 47 N.E.2d 595, 602
(1943). Accord Arsenault v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 1373, 1379 (D.
Mass.), ffd, 636 F.2d 1199 (1st Cir. 1980); Pirre v. Printing Devs., Inc., 468 F. Supp.
1028, 1041 (S.D.N.Y.), ffd, 614 F.2d 1290 (2d Cir. 1979). In Pirre, the defendant tried
to distinguish between the status of corporate employees, arguing that a defamatory
communication to an officer as opposed to an ordinary corporate employee is not a
communication to a third person and thus does not constitute a publication. In re-
sponse, the court said it could find no distinction between communications to corpo-
rate officers and ordinary corporate employees:
While corporate officers may be, as defendant contends, the embodiment of
the corporation, they remain individuals with distinct personalities and opin-
ions, which opinions may be affected just as surely as those of other employ.
ees by the spread of injurious falsehoods. It is this evil that the law of
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The defense of privilege is indeed widely available. In recon-
ciling the interests of the corporation with the interests of the
defamed, one court stated:
Admittedly, corporations, like other business forms, have a le-
gitimate interest in free communications between their officers
and employees on business-related matters. This interest, how-
ever, is adequately--and exclusively-protected by the quali-
fied privilege attaching to such communications ....
Questions of privilege should not be confused with the issue ofpublication.137
Many courts have embraced this analysis by finding a publi-
cation but recognizing the existence of a qualified privilege." s
VII
Conclusion
The no-publication rule in defamation can be traced back to
cases involving dictation to stenographers. 1" A rule that began
as an attempt by some courts to protect what was considered a
necessary business function has been expanded in some states
into a broad rule affording absolute protection for all communi-
cations between corporate employees. 140 Commerce is un-
doubtedly furthered when businesspersons are allowed to
communicate without fear of a defamation action. Unfortu-
nately, businesspersons can be protected only at the expense of
lessening the protections afforded potential defamation plain-
defamation is designed to remedy. To find no inter-personal communication
when a corporate employee speaks to a corporate officer would be to ignore
the distinct personalities of the human beings involved.
Pirre, 468 F. Supp. at 1041.
137. Pirre, 468 F. Supp. at 1042.
138. "It appears to be generally recognized that communications between officers
and employees of a corporation... are qualifiedly privileged if made in good faith
and in the usual course of business." Conwell v. Spur Oil Co., 240 S.C. 170, 179, 125
S.E.2d 270, 275 (1962). Accord Globe Furniture Co. v. Wright, 265 F. 873, 874 (D.C.
Cir. 1920); Carter v. Catfish Cabin, 316 So. 2d 517, 522 (La. App. 1975); Murphy v.
Johns-Manville Prods., 45 N.J. Super. 478, 489-90, 133 A.2d 34, 40 (1957); Benson v.
Hall, 339 So. 2d 570, 573 (Miss. 1976); Mortensen v. Life Ins. Corp., 6 Utah 2d 408, 410,
315 P.2d 283, 284 (1957); Houston Printing Co. v. Jones, 282 S.W. 854, 857 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1926); Terry v. Hubbell, 22 Conn. Supp. 248, 256, 167 A.2d 919, 923 (1960);
Tumbarella v. Kroger Co., 85 Mich. App. 482, 493-94, 271 N.W.2d 284, 289 (1978); Gem
Trading Co. v. Cudahy Corp., 22 Wash. App. 278, 281, 588 P.2d 1222, 1224 (1978);
Fulton v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 220 S.C. 287, 296, 67 S.E.2d 425, 429 (1951); Sheftall
v. Central of Ga. Ry., 123 Ga. 589, 592, 51 S.E. 646, 648 (1905); Kroger Co. v. Young, 210
Va. 564, 568, 172 S.E.2d 720, 723 (1970).
139. See supra notes 34-56 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 57-78 and accompanying text.
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tiffs. Moreover, there is an inverse relationship between these
interests: as businesspersons receive more protection from def-
amation suits, potential plaintiffs necessarily become less pro-
tected from harm to their reputations.
The interests of businesspersons must be balanced against
the competing interests of potential plaintiffs. The no-publica-
tion rule provides what is in effect an absolute privilege to de-
fame because a finding of no-publication aborts the analysis
before the issue of malice is ever reached. One's right to be free
from injury to reputation-the sole purpose of the tort of defa-
mation-is thereby left unprotected.
Absolute privileges have only been extended to a few situa-
tions where society's interest in the free flow of information is
so great that nothing is permitted to interfere with the trans-
mission of such information.14 ' Communications between cor-
porate employees, even if directly furthering the corporation's
business, are not occasions of such societal importance that the
right of persons to be free from injuries to their reputations
should be totally abrogated.
Rather, communications between corporate employees made
within the scope of employment should receive a qualified priv-
ilege. Potential plaintiffs receive protection from defamatory
communications not made in good faith on the theory that a
person's right to be free from harm to reputation takes prece-
dence over society's interest in encouraging the transmission of
statements that are reckless or knowingly false. Businessper-
sons are still protected from defamation suits as long as they
transmit information in good faith.
The courts that have adopted the no-publication rule have af-
forded businesspersons greater protection than is warranted.
Granting an absolute privilege in the form of the no-publication
rule violates both the traditional theory behind the tort of defa-
mation and the policy underlying the doctrine of respondeat su-
perior. Instead of the no-publication rule, a traditional analysis
view of publication approximating the following should be
.applied:
1. Did the employee make the allegedly false and defamatory
communication to a person other than the plaintiff?'2
A. If the answer is no, there has been no publication and
141. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
142. See upra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
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consequently no liability. This is appropriate since the plain-
tiff's reputation has not been harmed. The analysis terminates
here.
B. If the answer is yes, there has been a publication regard-
less of whether or not the recipient of the communication is a
co-employee. The analysis proceeds.
2. Is the communication absolutely privileged? 1'
A. If the answer is yes, the employee/defamer is not liable,
and the corporation cannot be liable either. The analysis termi-
nates here.
B. If the answer is no, the analysis proceeds.
3. Is the communication qualifiedly privileged?1"
A. If the answer is no, the employee/defamer is liable. As
to the corporation's liability under respondeat superior:145
(1) If the employee/defamer was acting within the scope of
employment at the time of the communciation and in the ac-
tual performance of his or her duties of employment, and the
communication related to the matter in question, the corpora-
tion is liable as well.
(2) If the employee/defamer was not acting within the scope
of employment, the corporation is not liable.
B. If the answer is yes, was the privilege lost by abuse? 1'
(1) If the employee/defamer exceeded the scope of the privi-
lege, then he or she is liable. As to the corporation's liability, if
the employee/defamer was acting within the scope of employ-
ment at the time of the communication and in the actual per-
formance of his or her duties of employment, and the
communication related to the matter in question, the corpora-
tion is liable as well.
(2) If the employee/defamer did not exceed the scope of the
privilege, the privilege immunizes the employee from liability.
The corporation would also be immunized from liability since
its employee is not liable.
Returning to the hypothetical with which this note began,
this analysis would produce the following results: because the
president of G.M. ordered the distribution of an allegedly de-
famatory circular to persons other than Ms. DeFamed, namely
143. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
144. See supru notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
145. See auprm notes 26-33 and accompanying text
146. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
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100,000 G.M. employees, there has been a publication regardless
of the fact that the recipients of the communication were co-
employees of Ms. DeFamed. Since the occasion for the commu-
nication was not one to which an absolute privilege applies,147
the focus should be on possible existence of a qualified privi-
lege.' 4  The president and the 100,000 G.M. employees may
have had a common interest in the communication, and the cir-
cular may have been reasonably calculated to protect or further
that interest.4 9 If no such common interest existed, the presi-
dent would be liable for the circular should it prove to be de-
famatory. G.M. would also be liable under the doctrine of
respondeat superior 15w since the president was acting within the
scope of corporate duties. If such a common interest existed,
the court should focus on whether or not the privilege was
abused.' 51 If the privilege was abused, perhaps because the
president acted in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of
the circular, the president and G.M. would be jointly liable for
the circular. If the privilege was not abused, both the president
and G.M. would be immunized from liability.
This analysis will reconcile society's interest in the free flow
of business information with the individual's right to be free of
harm to reputation.
147. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 13-25 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 13-25 and accompanying text.
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